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Abstract− This paper uses the concepts of information 
quality to identify the preventable variation in terms of 
disruption and delay within the operating rooms.  This 
paper has presented the results of 22 cases undertaken 
inside operating rooms of a public hospital in Australia.  
Results demonstrated that preventable variation 
resulted from poor information quality increases 
surgical time and forced surgeons and patients to 
endure an unnecessarily average delay of 25.68% (or 
about 26%) of the total surgery time. Such additional 
time could be utilised to deal with the pressure of 
emergency cases and to reduce the waiting lists for 
elective surgery.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Harders et al. [1] point out that improving the 
performance of operating rooms (ORs) is the key to 
improving services for patients. More efficient use of 
ORs will reduce waiting times in patient treatment 
and ultimately reduces waiting lists; however, process 
variation remains a major reason for poor 
performance within ORs. Process variation frequently 
arises from disruption and delay [2, 3]. These 
disruptions are often a result of lack of consistency 
between planned theatre session lists and the manner 
in which the task is actually carried out. Delays arise 
when procedures exceed scheduled time allocations, 
or when lists are altered to accommodate additional 
patients [4]. Literature indicates that delays and 
disruptions have substantial financial implications for 
hospitals, affects the quality of patient care, prolong 
waiting lists, and are recognised as a growing 
problem throughout the developed world [5, 6].  In 
addition, there is a strong relationship between 
disruptions within ORs and medical surgical errors 
[7]. Reducing disruption improves patient flow and 
reduces possible medical errors [1,4, 5-7]. 
The literature stresses that most process variations 
within ORs are the result of controllable variables 
within the system, process and conditions [7-12]. 
Variation resulting from controllable variables is 
referred to as ‘preventive variation’. This paper 
stresses that managing the quality of information flow 
to and within the operating rooms will considerably 
reduces the preventable variation.  This study uses the 
concepts of Information Quality (IQ) and identifies 
five information elements that govern the flow of 
information.  These elements are input, output, 
guidance, constraint and feedback.  
This research employs case study methodology in 
which the operating theatre suite of a regional public 
hospital was selected.   A total of 22 surgery 
operations conducted inside ORs were observed and 
activities were recorded.   The results show that more 
than 25% of the average surgery time is preventable 
variation. This paper is structured as follows.  The 
next section reviews the literature for variation in 
ORs, IQ dimensions and the elements of information 
flow.  Section III presents brief description of the 
selected case hospital and the procedure used to 
collect data. The results of observations for 22 case 
surgeries are presented in section IV.  Section V 
concludes the paper.    
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In a surgical setting, disruption is any action or 
event that alters the planned surgical flow and forces 
surgeons to either wait or perform surgery 
inefficiently. Delay is any action which prevents the 
planned flow of a patient to the operating rooms. 
Variation in terms of disruption and delays prolongs 
surgery session time, increase costs [13]. The time 
surgeons have to wait reduces quality of performance 
[7].  In addition, disruption to surgical flow for one 
patient delays the next surgery and forces the next 
patient to wait. Barlow [14] emphasises a direct 
relation between waiting time and patient 
dissatisfaction.  
Variation may comprise minor events.  The 
accumulation of these events, however, creates stress 
and fatigue and, as a result, predisposes the surgical 
team to errors [7, 8].  Wiegmann, et al. [7] conclude 
that lack of  mental readiness and inability to 
maintain focus, are rated by surgeons as the most 
important factors causing errors. An error is the 
failure of a planned action to be completed as 
intended (error of execution) or the use of a wrong 
plan to achieve an aim (error of planning) [8, 9]. 
However, Sexton, Thomas and Helmreich [15] 
conclude that error is difficult to discuss in medicine 
and that medical staff are more likely to deny the 
effects of stress and fatigue. Some medical errors 
could lead to adverse events.  An adverse event is 
defined as an injury caused by medical management 
rather than the underlying condition of the patient 
(McFadden et al. 2006).  An adverse event 
attributable to error is a preventable adverse event [9].  
Several studies have focused on reducing 
surgeon’s waiting time by reducing variation during 
turnaround (turnover) times [16].  Other studies 
attempt the same goal by reducing variation during 
nonoperative time.   Turnover time is the time from 
departure of the previous patient from an operating 
room to the entrance of the next patient into the 
operating rooms. Nonoperative time is the time 
between when surgical activity ends and the next 
patient is ready for surgical prep.  It includes turnover 
time, plus anaesthesia induction and emergency time 
(post-anaesthesia period). Despite the present study 
focusing on variation in surgical flow as a source of 
preventable adverse events, there has been no 
sufficient research adequately dealing with 
interdependencies between variation within ORs and 
actions conducted prior to the start of the surgery.  
This paper addresses this gap in the literature.  In 
addition, this study goes a step further by considering 
the effect of variation on the actual performance of 
the surgeons.   
A.  Information Quality 
In 1999, gate [17] states that “How you can gather, 
manage and use information will determine whether 
you win or lose”. Gates’ statement implies that there 
are some issues that traditional information 
management systems have not addressed. One critical 
issue in particular is the quality of information an 
organisation should gather, manage and use.   
Information quality (IQ) is multidimensional.  
This means that organisations must use multiple 
dimensions to evaluate the quality of their 
information or data.   Several researchers have 
attempted to identify the IQ dimensions. Table 1 
defines the common related IQ dimensions[18-20].    
 
 
TABLE 1.  DEFINITIONS OF THE COMMON IQ DIMENSIONS USED IN LITERATURE.  (ADAPTED FROM SEVERAL RESEARCH WORKS).  
 
Dimension Definition 
Accessibility The degree to which information is available, easily obtainable or quickly 
retrievable when needed. Accessibility depends on the customer’s circumstances.   
Accuracy The degree to which information represents the real world state. 
Amount of 
Information 
This dimension measures the appropriateness of the volume of information to the 
user or task at hand 
Believability This dimension measures the user assessment of trueness and credibility of 
information.    
Coherency  This measures how information “hangs together” and provides one meaning to 
different users.      
Compatibility The level to which information can be combined with other information to form 
certain knowledge.  
Completeness  The degree to which information is sufficient enough to depict every state of the 
task at hand or the represented system, that is, assesses the degree of missing 
information.  
Conciseness of  
representation 
The compactness of information representation.  
Consistency of 
representation 
The degree of similarity and compatibility of formats used to represent 
information by different systems/users.   
Ease of manipulation  The applicability of information to different tasks.   
Ease of 
understanding 
The degree of user’s comprehension of information.  
Free-of-error The degree to which information is correct.  This dimension measures the number, 
percent or ratio of incorrect or unreliable information.   
Interpretability  The appropriateness and clarity of information, language and symbols to the user.   
Objectivity This dimension measures the information impartiality including whether 
information is unbiased and unprejudiced.    
Relevancy Relevancy indicates whether information addresses the customer’s needs. It 
reflects the level of appropriateness of information to the task under consideration.   
Reputation The degree of respect and admiration for both information source and information 
content.    
Security The level of either restriction on access to information or appropriateness of 
information back-up - protecting information from disasters.      
 
Lillrank [21] suggests that the primary problem in 
service operation is not the quality of the actual input-
output conversation, but the quality of information 
that regulates or constrains the implementation of the 
process.  Al-Hakim [3] refers to information that 
governs, regulates or constrains the activities of a 
process as ‘governance information’.   
B.  Elements of Governance Information  
Governance information has five sets of 
information elements. These are ‘input’, ‘output’, 
‘guidance’, ‘constraint’ and ‘feedback’.  Input 
information is information in forms of documents or 
instruction that is related to the operation under 
consideration.  The quality of input information is 
measured using IQ dimensions.  Output information 
is information in form of documents and instructions 
created as a result of implementing the operation. 
Guidance is made up of the policies, procedures and 
rules governing the implementation of the activity. 
The constraint comprises information from prior 
activities which influences or adjusts the 
implementation of a current activity or adjusts 
guidance information.  Feedback for an activity 
comprises information received from a subsequent 
activity that may require changes in the 
implementation of the activity. Figure 1 illustrates the 
five elements of information; input, output, 
constraint, guidance and feedback.  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Al-Hakim (2007, 2008) 
Figure 1. Elements of information controlling an 
activity. 
 
Al-Hakim [3] emphasises that identifying the 
elements of governance information for surgical 
activities and their interdependencies is the first step 
towards improving the quality of information flow 
within surgical activities and, as a result, reducing 
disruptions inside operating rooms.   
  
III.  THE SELECTED CASE HOSPITAL 
The selected case hospital (the Hospital) is a 
public regional hospital. This Hospital is a major 
referral centre providing a comprehensive range of 
health care services to the region and surrounding 
rural areas. It is also a teaching hospital. The Hospital 
has a 261 bed facility, including 164 acute beds, 57 
mental health beds and 40 day beds. It employs 
around 2000 staff and there are 13 departments in this 
hospital.  The Surgical Department offers four types 
of services: surgical services, anaesthetic services, 
orthopaedic services and peri-operative services. The 
operating theatre suit of the Surgical Department 
includes six ORs.  Four ORs are used for elective lists 
that are run for two sessions per day from 08:30 to 
12:30 and again from 13:00 to 16:30 hours. The two 
other ORs are dedicated to 24 hours emergency 
surgery and to 24 hours caesarean section surgery. 
There are eight recovery wards catering to the theatre 
patients.  Post-operative patients are closely 
monitored until patients are physiologically stable. 
Centrally located in the operating theatre suit, the 
sterile stock room is staffed by a registered nurse and 
an assistant in nursing. Reusable and disposable 
sterile supplies are stored in this area.   
 
 A.   Data collection procedure 
At the day of observation, the researcher arrived 
early enough so as to be able to change clothing 
because the observation is in a sterile area of the 
operating theatre suite. The liaison officer obtained a 
schedule of the surgeries that would be considered 
suitable for observation to generate data for the study. 
In the preoperative department, the liaison officer 
introduced the researchers to patients and staff and 
explained to them that the researchers were observing 
the surgery process and that information would be 
recorded with no identification of the names of 
individuals. The liaison officer obtained the consent 
of the surgery team before the start of observations.  
The researchers observed the activities, along with 
the liaison officer during the observations.  
The research team followed patient’s progress 
from pre-operative holding area until discharge. The 
researchers observed and recorded the timing of all 
events inside the OR.  Variation resulted from the 
following information elements are observed [22]:  
1. Input information: There are three types of 
input information that causes variation: 
• incomplete, incorrect or not updated 
information of the patient record may cause 
variation as a result of the time required to 
adjust information. Information contained in 
consent form and surgery preference sheet 
are mainly considered in this project; 
• lack of information that allows the medical 
professional to conduct activities in efficient 
way.  This mainly resulted from lack of 
understanding the principles of productivity 
management techniques such as motion 
economy within the operating room [23]; 
and 
• lack of technical information to 
perform the activities – this part of 
information is beyond the objective 
of this research.   
2. Guidance information: The observer 
records variation results from the 
failure of following the operating 
room policies and regulation.  
3. Constraint information: The constraint 
information resulted from the lack of 
adequately flow of information between 
professional and related staff prior to 
conducting the surgery.  For instance, 
variation may occur as a result of 
inadequately following the surgeon 
preferences which prepared prior to having 
the patient in the operating theatre.  This 
type of variation resulted mainly from lack 
of coordination.  
4. Feedback: Lack of adequately flow 
of information from subsequent 
sections to operating theatre may 
create variation.  For example, bed 
unavailability in the recovery area 
may delay the movement of a patient 
from the operating room or affect 
admission of patients to the operating 
room. 
At the end of each observation, data were entered 
into an Excel data file and the summary reviewed. 
For each observation a narrative summary, including 
any notable features of the observed case and details 
of observed errors were recorded. 
After completed observation of each surgery case, 
the researchers managed discussion meetings with 
liaison officer, surgeons and nurses for the purpose of 
review and revise the major non-value added 
activities and causes drafts recorded by researcher.  
 
IV.  DATA ANALYSIS 
A total of 22 surgeries were observed.  Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics for the 22 surgeries. The 
table shows surgery session time, preventable 
variation time and percentage of preventable variation 
for each surgery. Surgery session time and variation 
and session time were measured in minutes. The 
longest session time in the cases observed was 192 
minutes and the shortest was 10 minutes. Total 
session time for all the cases was 1496 minutes, with 
a mean of 68 minuted and standard deviation of 48.41 
minutes.   The average preventable variation time per 
surgery session is about 17.5 minute with standard 
deviation of 10.5 minutes. Results demonstrated that 
lack of managing information flow elements created 
preventable variation which  caused an increase in 
surgical time and forced surgeons and patients to 
endure an unnecessarily average delay of 25.68% (or 
about 26%) of the total surgery time. Such additional 
time could be utilised to deal with the pressure of 
emergency cases and to reduce the waiting lists for 
elective surgery. 
 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE PREVENTABLE DELAY IN 
VALUE ADDED AND NON-VALUE ADDED ACTIVITIES 
 
Surgery 
No. 
Total 
session 
time 
Total 
variation 
time 
% 
Preventable  
variation 
1 36 25.6 71.11% 
2 51 25 49.02% 
3 107 27.4 25.61% 
4 58 20.8 35.86% 
5 110 22.2 20.18% 
6 25 10.2 40.80% 
7 80 13.2 16.50% 
8 64 16.4 25.63% 
9 162 41.8 25.80% 
10 46 15.4 33.48% 
11 29 11 37.93% 
12 43 9.4 21.86% 
13 55 12.2 22.18% 
14 105 19.4 18.48% 
15 17 8.2 48.24% 
16 23 4.2 18.26% 
17 46 7.2 15.65% 
18 71 16 22.54% 
19 134 30 22.39% 
20 32 8.6 26.88% 
21 192 38 19.79% 
22 10 2 20.00% 
Total 1496 384.2 25.68% 
Average 68.00 17.46  
Standard 
Deviate 48.41 10.53  
 
Table 3 summarises the main causes for the 
preventable variation. The failure to adequately 
managing input information contributed about 51% of 
the total preventable variation being about 34.5% 
(about 9% of the total surgery time) resulted from the 
lack of information related to productivity 
management principles. Poor information quality in 
surgeon reference sheet contributed 12.8% of the total 
preventable variation while the poor information 
quality in consent form increased the preventable 
variation by about 13% (or in average of 3.4% of the 
total surgery time).    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 3. MAIN CAUSES FOR THE PREVENTABLE VARIATION  
 
 
Preventable 
variation % of 
session 
time 
Information 
element minutes % 
Input information: 
Consent form 15.1 3.93% 1.01% 
Input Information: 
Surgeon preference 
sheets 49.5 12.88% 3.31% 
Input information: 
productivity 
management 132.0 34.36% 8.82% 
Guidance 
information 18.9 4.92% 1.26% 
Constraint 
information and 
feedback: 
Coordination 168.7 43.91% 11.28% 
Total 384.2  25.68% 
  
The results also indicates that the failure to 
adequately managing the constraint information and 
feedback disturbed the coordination with or within 
operating rooms and increases the presentable 
variation by about 44% or in average of 11% of the 
total surgery session time.  Failure to follow exactly 
the guidance information (regulation and policy) 
contributed only 5% of the total preventable variation 
time (or about 1.3% of the total surgery session time).  
   
V.  Summary and conclusion 
Variation can be seen as undesirable gap between 
an ideal and actual state that hinders a worker’s 
ability to complete his or her tasks within the 
specified time. Variation in surgical setting frequently 
arises from disruption and delay. Variation affects the 
quality of patient care, prolong waiting lists, and 
result medical errors. Most variation within ORs are 
the result of controllable variables within the system, 
process and conditions. Variation resulting from 
controllable variables is referred to as ‘preventive 
variation’. This research deals with preventable 
variation within ORs. This research uses the concepts 
of Information Quality (IQ) and employs case study 
methodology in which the operating theatre suite of a 
regional public hospital was selected.   A total of 22 
surgeries were observed and activities within 
operating rooms were recorded.  Information 
elements affecting the surgery performance and 
creating variation were discussed with related 
professional after the surgery sessions. The total 
session time for all the 22 cases was 1496 minutes, 
with a mean of 68 minuted and standard deviation of 
48.41 minutes. Results indicates that failure of 
managing information elements creates preventable 
variation ranged between 14.93%  to 71.11% of the 
surgery session time and caused an average increase 
in surgical time of about 26% of the total surgery 
time. Such additional time could be utilised to deal 
with the pressure of emergency cases and to reduce 
the waiting lists for elective surgery.   
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